The uniform one-dimensional fragment of first-order logic, U 1 , is a recently introduced formalism that extends two-variable logic in a natural way to contexts with relations of all arities. We survey properties of U 1 and investigate its relationship to description logics designed to accommodate higher arity relations, with particular attention given to DLR reg . We also define a description logic version of a variant of U 1 and prove a range of new results concerning the expressivity of U 1 and related logics.
Introduction
Two-variable logic [10, 24] and the guarded fragment [1] are currently perhaps the most widely studied subsystems of first-order logic. Two-variable logic FO 2 was proved decidable in [19] , and the satisfiability problem of FO 2 was shown to be NEXPTIME-complete in [6] . The extension of two-variable logic with counting quantifiers, FOC 2 , was proved decidable in [8, 20] and subsequently shown to be NEXPTIME-complete in [21] . Research on extensions and variants of two-variable logic is currently very active. Recent research has mainly concerned decidability and complexity issues in restriction to particular classes of structures and also questions related to different built-in features and operators that increase the expressivity of the base language. Recent articles in the field include for example [3, 4, 11, 25] and several others.
The guarded fragment was shown 2EXPTIME-complete in [7] and in fact EXPTIME-complete over bounded arity vocabularies in the same article. The guarded fragment has since then generated a vast literature. The fragment has recently been significantly generalized in the article [2] which introduces the guarded negation first-order logic GNFO. Intuitively, GNFO only allows negations of formulae that are guarded in the sense of the guarded fragment. The guarded negation fragment has been shown complete for 2NEXPTIME in [2] .
The recent article [9] introduced the uniform one-dimensional fragment, U 1 , which is a natural generalization of FO 2 to contexts with relations of arbitrary arities. Intuitively, U 1 is a fragment of first-order logic obtained by restricting quantification to blocks of existential (universal) quantifiers that leave at most one free variable in the resulting formula. Additionally, a uniformity condition applies to the use of atomic formulae: if n, k ≥ 2, then a Boolean combination of atoms R(x 1 , ..., x k ) and S(y 1 , ..., y n ) is allowed only if the sets {x 1 , ..., x k } and {y 1 , ..., y n } of variables are equal. Boolean combinations of formulae with at most one free variable can be formed freely, and the use of equality is unrestricted. Several variants of U 1 have also been investigated in [9] and the two subsequent papers [12, 13] . Perhaps the easiest way to gain intuitive insight on U 1 is to consider the fully uniform fragment, FU 1 , which is a slight restriction of U 1 introduced in the current article. It turns out that FU 1 can be represented roughly as the standard polyadic modal logic where novel accessibility relations can be formed by the Boolean combination and permutation of atomic accessibility relations. Recall that polyadic modal logic is the extension of modal logic with formulae χ := R (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ k ) interpreted such that M, w |= χ iff there exist points u 1 , ..., u k such that (w, u 1 , ..., u k ) ∈ R and M, u i |= ϕ i for each i. It also turns out, as we shall see, that over vocabularies with at most binary relations, FU 1 is in fact equi-expressive with FO 2 . This result extends a similar observation from [18] concerning Boolean modal logic with the inverse operator and a built-in identity modality. It was proved in [18] that this logic is expressively complete for FO 2 . The fact that FU 1 collapses to FO 2 over binary vocabularies can be taken to indicate that FU 1 is a natural and in some sense minimal generalization of FO 2 to higher arity contexts. The uniform one-dimensional fragment U 1 was shown to have the finite model property and a NEXPTIME-complete decision problem in [12] , thereby establishing that the transition from FO 2 to U 1 comes without a cost in complexity. It was also shown in [12] that U 1 is incomparable in expressivity with FOC 2 ; we will prove in the current article that U 1 is incomparable with GNFO, too. We note, however, that the article [9] already established a similar incomparability result concerning GNFO and the equality-free fragment of U 1 . The article [12] also showed that the extension of U 1 with counting quantifiers is undecidable. The article [9] , in turn, established that relaxing either of the two principal constraints of the syntax of U 1 -formulae-leaving two free variables after quantification or violating the uniformity condition-leads to undecidability. Building on [9] and [12] , the article [13] investigated variants of U 1 in the presence of built-in equivalence relations. It was shown, e.g., that while U 1 becomes 2NEXPTIME-complete when a built-in equivalence is added, a certain natural restriction of U 1 (which still contains FO 2 ) remains NEXPTIME-complete. In the current article we briefly discuss the above collection of results on U 1 and its variants and list a number of related open problems.
Unlike the guarded fragment and GNFO, two-variable logic does not cope well with relations of arities greater than two, and the same applies to FOC 2 . In database theory contexts, for example, this can be a major drawback. Therefore the scope of research on two-variable logics is significantly restricted. The uniform one-dimensional fragment U 1 extends two-variable logics in a way that leads to the possibility of investigating systems with relations of all arities.
Another possible advantage of U 1 is its one-dimensionality, i.e., the fact that its formulae are essentially of the type ϕ(x), where x is a free variable. This links U 1 to description logics in a natural way, as formulae of U 1 can be regarded as concepts in the description logic sense. Below we make use of this issue and define a description logic DL FU 1 , which we prove to be expressively equivalent to the fully uniform one-dimensional fragment FU 1 . The logic DL FU 1 makes explicit the link between FU 1 and polyadic modal logic we mentioned above. It can be seen as the canonical extension of the description logic ALBO id [22] to higher arity contexts. While ALBO id is ALC extended with Boolean and inverse operators on roles, an identity role and singleton concepts, DL FU 1 is essentially the same system with roles of all arities. The relational inverse operator is generalized to an operator that slightly generalizes the relational permutation operator.
Higher arity relations arise naturally in contexts relevant to description logics. Consider for example the ternary role R such that R(a, b, c) iff a has contracted a virus b in country c, or the quaternary role S such that S(c, d, e, f ) iff c and d have sold e to f . It is easy to see by a counting argument that a k-ary relation cannot be encoded by a finite number of relations of lower arity without changing the domain, and therefore-in addition to aesthetic considerations-a direct access to higher arity roles can be advantageous.
Higher arity roles have of course been investigated before in the desctiption logic literature, for example in [5, 17, 23] . Below we compare DL FU 1 and the system DLR reg from [5] , which includes, e.g., the union, composition and transitive reflexive closure operators for binary roles as well as operators that enable the creation of binary relations from higher arity roles. We show that DL FU 1 and DLR reg are incomparable in expressivity. While this result itself is not at all surprizing, it is still worth proving since the related arguments directly demonstrate the relative expressivities of DLR reg and DL FU 1 . We end the article by identifying a fragment of DLR reg which is in a certain sense maximal with the property that it embeds into DL FU 1 . In the context of this investigation we discuss the curious fact that while U 1 can count, it cannot count well enough to express the number restriction operators of DLR reg . In the investigations below concerning expressivity issues, we make occasional use of the novel Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé (EF) game for U 1 from [13] . The related concrete arguments shed light on the expressivity properties of U 1 .
Finally, it is worth pointing out here that a rather nice and potentially fruitful feature of DL FU 1 is that it is based on the syntactically and seman-tically same approach as standard polyadic modal logic. Thereby DL FU 1 extends the celebrated and fruitful link between modal and description logics to higher arity contexts in a way that preserves the close relationship between the two fields.
Preliminaries
We let VAR denote a countably infinite set of variable symbols. Let X = {x 1 , ..., x k } be a finite set of variable symbols and let R be an n-ary relation symbol; R is not allowed to be the identity symbol here. An atomic formula R(x i 1 , ..., x in ) is called an X-atom if {x i 1 , ..., x in } = X. For example, assuming x, y, z to be distinct variables, both S(x, y) and T (x, x, y, y, x) are {x, y}-atoms while P (x) and R(x, y, z) are not.
Let Z + be the set of positive integers. We let V denote the infinite relational vocabulary V := k ∈ Z + τ k , where τ k is a countably infinite set of k-ary relation symbols; the equality symbol is not in V . A unary V -atom is an atomic formula of the form P (x) or R(x, ..., x), where P, R ∈ V . Here (x, ..., x) denotes the tuple that repeats x exactly n times, n being the arity of R.
The set of formulae of the equality-free uniform one-dimensional fragment U 1 (wo =) of first-order logic is the smallest set F satisfying the following conditions (cf. [9] ).
Every unary
4. Let Y := {x 0 , ..., x k } ⊆ VAR and X ⊆ Y . Let ϕ be a Boolean combination of X-atoms over V and formulae in F whose free variables (if any) are in Y . Then ∃x 1 ...∃x k ϕ ∈ F and ∃x 0 ...∃x k ϕ ∈ F.
is not because {x, y} = {y, z}. This latter formula is said to violate the uniformity condition of U 1 . The formula ∃yR(x, y, z) is also illegitimate because it violates one-dimensionality, leaving two variables free instead of one. However, the sentence ∃x∃z∃yR(x, y, z) is legitimate, and so is ∀x∃z∃y(R(x, y, z) ∧ ∃u¬U (y, u)), while the sentence ∀x∀z∃yR(x, y, z) is not.
The fully uniform one-dimensional fragment FU 1 is the logic whose formulae are obtained from formulae of U 1 (wo =) by allowing the free substitution of any collection of binary relation symbols by the equality symbol =. The uniform one-dimensional fragment U 1 is obtained by adding to the above four clauses that define the set F of formulae of U 1 (wo =) the additional clause x = y ∈ F.
For example ∃y∃z(R(y, z, x) ∧ x = y ∧ ∃zS(y, z)) is a formula of U 1 but not of FU 1 . Clearly FU 1 is a fragment of U 1 . The following proposition, where FO 2 denotes two-variable logic with equality, is easy to prove using disjunctive normal form representations of formulae. However, U 1 is strictly more expressive than two-variable logic FO 2 even over the empty vocabulary, because U 1 can count better than FO 2 : we observe that for example the sentence ∃x∃y∃z(x = y ∧ x = z ∧ y = z) is a U 1 -formula. It is well known and easy to show by a two-pebble-game argument (see [16] for pebble games) that this sentence is not expressible in FO 2 .
It is easy to see that FO 2 and therefore FU 1 can define the property that |P | = 1 for a unary predicate P . Thus nominals can be simulated in those logics. The logic U 1 can define even the properties |P | ≤ k, |P | ≥ k and |P | = k for any finite k. However, the counting capacity of U 1 is restricted in an interesting way, as we will see later on; U 1 cannot make counting statements about the in-degrees and out-degrees of binary relations.
Finally, the U 1 -sentence ∃x∀y∀z(R(y, z) → (x = y ∨ x = z)) provides a perhaps more interesting example of what is definable in U 1 but not in FO 2 . This sentence states that there is an element that belongs to every edge of R. It is easy to see by a two-pebble-game argument that this property is not expressible in FO 2 : the Duplicator wins the two-pebble-game played on K 2 and K 3 , where K n is the n-clique. Recall that the n-clique is the structure with n elements where R is the total binary relation with the reflexive loops removed.
Complexity of U 1 and its variants
The complexity of U 1 was identified in [12] by showing that the logic has the exponential model property.
Theorem 1 ([12]
). Every satisfiable U 1 -formula ϕ has a model whose size is bounded exponentially in |ϕ|.
Theorem 2 ([12]).
The satisfiability problem (= finite satisfiability problem) for U 1 is NEXPTIME-complete.
The argument in [12] leading to the above results bears at least some degree of resemblance to the NEXPTIME upper bound proof of FO 2 by Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi in [6] . It turns out that U 1 -formulae can be transferred into equisatisfiable formulae in a generalized version of the Scott normal form specially designed for U 1 , and the exponential model property can then be established by appropriately modifying and extending the arguments applied in [6] .
The complexity results of the article [12] were extended in [13] . If L denotes a fragment of first-order logic and R 1 , ..., R k are binary relation symbols, then we let L(R 1 , ..., R k ) denote the language obtained by allowing for the free substitution of identity symbols in L-formulae by the special symbols R i . The article [13] investigated U 1 and its variants over models with a built-in equivalence relation ∼. It was shown that the satisfiability (SAT) and finite satisfiability (FINSAT) problems for U 1 (∼) are 2NEXPTIME-complete. The article [13] also identified a natural restriction SU 1 of U 1 that still extends FO 2 and showed that the SAT and FINSAT problems for SU 1 (∼) are only NEXPTIME-complete; see [13] for the formal definition of SU 1 . Furthermore, the article [13] established that the SAT and FINSAT-problems of SU 1 (∼ 1 , ∼ 2 ), i.e., SU 1 with two built-in equivalences, is undecidable. This contrasts with the case for FO 2 which remains decidable with two equivalences (SAT [14] and FINSAT [15] ).
Several immediately interesting open problems remain, for example the decidability issue for U 1 (≤), where ≤ denotes a built-in linear order. Also, while U 1 (tr ) (i.e., U 1 with a built-in transitive relation tr ) was shown undecidable in [13] , it was left open whether U 1 (tr (uniform)) is decidable; here U 1 (tr (uniform)) denotes the language obtained from U 1 by allowing the free substitution of any instances of a binary relation (rather than the equality symbol) by the built-in transitive relation tr . .
Expressivity issues
In this section we provide an overview on the expressivity of U 1 and its variants. The following theorem from [12] relates the expressivities of U 1 and FOC 2 .
Theorem 3 ([12]
). U 1 and FOC 2 are incomparable in expressivity.
Proof. It is easy to show that the U 1 -sentence ∃x∃y∃zR(x, y, z) cannot be expressed in FOC 2 , and therefore U 1 ≤ FOC 2 . To prove that FOC 2 ≤ U 1 , let S be a binary relation symbol. We will show that U 1 cannot express the FOC 2 -definable condition that the in-degree (with respect to the relation S) at every node is at most one. Assume ϕ(S) is a U 1 -formula that defines the property. Consider the formula ϕ(S)∧∀x∃yS(x, y)∧∃x∀y¬S(y, x). It is clear that this formula has only infinite models, and thereby the assumption that U 1 can express ϕ(S) is false by the finite model property of U 1 (Theorem 1).
We next consider U 1 over vocabularies with at most binary relations.
Theorem 4 ([12])
. Consider models over a relational vocabulary τ with the arity bound two. Suppose that τ indeed contains at least one binary relation symbol. Then
Proof. We already discussed the strict inclusion FO 2 < U 1 above in the preliminaries section. A lengthy proof of the inclusion U 1 ≤ FOC 2 is given in [12] . The strictness of this inclusion follows from the proof of Theorem 3 where we showed that U 1 cannot express that the in-degree of a binary relation is at most one.
We then compare the expressivities of U 1 and the guarded negation fragment GNFO [2] . The first non-inclusion (U 1 ≤ GNFO) of the following theorem has been proved in [9] , where only the equality-free fragment of U 1 was investigated. The second non-inclusion (GNFO ≤ U 1 ) is new.
Theorem 5. U 1 and GNFO are incomparable in expressivity.
Proof. Define the two structures {a}, {(a, a)} and {a, b}, {(a, a), (b, b)} . It is straightforward to establish by using the bisimulation for GNFO, provided in [2] , that these two structures are bisimilar in the sense of GNFO. Thus the U 1 -sentence ∃x∃y ¬R(x, y) is not expressible in GNFO. Hence U 1 ≤ GNFO.
Consider then the GNFO-sentence ϕ := ∃x∃y∃z(Rxy ∧ Ryz ∧ Rzx). Let A denote the model consisting of four disjoint copies of the directed cycle with three elements. Let B be the model with three disjoint copies of the directed cycle with four elements. It follows rather directly from the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game for U 1 (which is defined in [13] ) that A and B satisfy the same U 1 -sentences. For the game-based argument to work, it is essential that the two models A and B have the same cardinality, because bijections between subsets of the domains of A and B are used in the game. (See [13] for a detailed discussion of the game.) With A and B defined in this way, the rest of the game-based argument is straightforward. We can therefore now conclude that U 1 cannot express the GNFO-sentence ϕ we fixed above, and hence GNFO ≤ U 1 .
Before we close the current section, we observe that all the above results concerning expressivity hold even if attention is limited to finite models only. The same proofs apply without modification, as the reader can check. This is especially interesting in the case of Theorem 3, whose proof makes use of the finite model property of U 1 .
Undecidability of U 1 with counting quantifiers
Since FOC 2 and U 1 are both NEXPTIME-complete, it is natural to ask whether the extension of U 1 by counting quantifiers (UC 1 ) remains decid-able. Formally, UC 1 is obtained from U 1 by allowing the free substitution of quantifiers ∃ by quantifiers ∃ ≥k , ∃ ≤k , ∃ =k .
While the transition from FO 2 to FOC 2 preserves NEXPTIME-completeness, the analogous step from U 1 to UC 1 crosses the undecidability barrier.
Theorem 6 ([12]
). The satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of UC 1 are Π 0 1 -complete and Σ 0 1 -complete, respectively. Thereby UC 1 has the same complexity as full first-order logic. It is an interesting open problem to identify natural logics that extend FOC 2 into higher arity contexts in a way that preserves decidability. Possible research directions here could involve for example investigating restrictions of UC 1 based on somewhat more limited ways of using the quantifiers ∃ ≥k , ∃ ≤k , ∃ =k .
U 1 and description logics
In this section we define a novel logic DL FU 1 which is a description logic version of FU 1 and compare it to DLR reg [5] , which is a well-known description logic that accommodates higher arity relations.
We first generalize the relational inverse operation to contexts with higher arity relations. When n is a positive integer, we let [n] denote the set {1, ..., n}. We let SRJ denote the set of all surjections σ : [k] → [m], such that 2 ≤ m ≤ k. When m = k, then σ is a permutation; permutations are natural generalizations of the relational inverse operator into higher arity contexts, and surjections generalize permutations an inch further. When we use SRJ in constructing the syntax of DL FU 1 below, we assume each function σ ∈ SRJ to be a suitable string listing the ordered pairs (n, k) such that σ(n) = k in binary.
The set R of roles of DL FU 1 is defined by the grammar
where R denotes an atomic role, ε the binary identity role and σ ∈ SRJ. Here R can have any arity greater or equal to two, and the arity of ε is two. The intersection of relations of different arity will produce the empty relation, so we may as well allow such terms. (We fix the arity of the empty relation in such cases to be two.) The set of concepts of DL FU 1 is given by the grammar
where A is an atomic concept and the arity of the relation term R is n + 1. An interpretation I is a pair (∆, · I ), where ∆ is a nonempty set and · I a function such that R I ⊆ ∆ k and A I ⊆ ∆ for atomic roles R and atomic concepts A; here k is the arity of R. The operators of DL FU 1 are defined as follows.
1.
. The arity of (σR) I is of course m.
(¬C)
m] acts on a relation R whose arity is not equal to n, the empty binary relation is produced. We need the surjection operators (rather than simply permutations) in order to express in DL FU 1 conditions such as the one given by the FU 1 -formula ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ S(x, y, x) ∧ P (y)). In the following theorem, equivalence means equivalence in the standard sense in which formulae of modal and predicate logic are compared. Proof. We only provide a rough sketch the proof. The most involved issue here is the translation of FU 1 -formulae of the type ∃x 1 ...∃x k ϕ into DL FU 1 , where ϕ is a Boolean combination of higher arity atoms and at most unary FU 1 -formulae. Here we put ϕ into disjunctive normal form and distribute the quantifier prefix over the disjunctions in order to obtain a disjunction of formulae of the type
where {y 1 , ..., y n } ⊆ {x 0 , x 1 , ..., x k }, {u 1 , ..., u m } ⊆ {x 0 , x 1 , ..., x k }, and where the term T (y 1 , ..., y n ) is a conjunction of higher arity literals (atoms and negated atoms) such that each literal has exactly the same set {y 1 , ..., y n } of variables. Such formulae can easily be translated into DL FU 1 , assuming inductively that we already know how to translate the unary FU 1 -formulae χ i (u i ).
We then define the description logic DLR reg from [5] and compare it to DL FU 1 . DLR reg is defined by the grammar
where R is an atomic role and A an atomic concept from a finite set V of atomic role and concept symbols. The indices i and j denote integers between 1 and n max (where n max is the maximum arity of the symbols in V), n denotes an integer between 2 and n max and k denotes a non-negative integer. All these numbers are encoded in binary.
An interpretation I = (∆, · I ) for DLR reg over V is any structure such that the following conditions are met (cf. [5] ).
1. For each atomic concept A ∈ V and atomic role R ∈ V, we have A ⊆ ∆ and R ⊆ ∆ n , where n is the arity of R.
2. For each n > 1, (⊤ n ) I is a subset of ∆ n that covers the relations of arity n.
5.
6. The operators •, ∪ and · * in the terms (E 1 • E 2 ), (E 1 ∪ E 2 ) and E * are interpreted in the usual way, i.e., • is the relational composition operator, ∪ the union and · * the transivitive reflexive closure operator.
DLR reg interpretations are associated with the atomic built-in relations ⊤ n . When comparing the expressivity of DLR reg with DL FU 1 below, we consider interpretations I where the relations ⊤ n are appropriate atomic built-in roles and thus directly available also in DL FU 1 .
Proposition 2. DLR reg and DL FU 1 are incomparable in expressvity.
Proof. It is easy to see that DLR reg is closed under disjoint copies such that if C I = U for some DLR reg -concept C, then C I 1 +I 2 = U 1 ∪U 2 , where I 1 +I 2 consists of two disjoint copies of I and obviously U 1 and U 2 are the related copies of U . Because of the free use of role negation in DL FU 1 , the same does not hold in that logic. For example the DL FU 1 -concept ¬∃(¬R).A, where R is a binary role, is satisfied in an interpretation consisting of a single element u that satisfies A and connects to itself via R. This interpretation together with a disjoint copy of itself does not satisfy ¬∃(¬R).A. Thus DL FU 1 is not contained in DLR reg .
For the converse, it suffices to observe that DL FU 1 cannot define the concept ∃(R * ).A. It is well known that this property is not first-order expressible, and thus it is not definable in DL FU 1 .
We finish up the current section by identifying a maximal fragment of DLR reg that embeds into DL FU 1 . What exactly we mean by maximality in this context will become clear below.
Let DLR 0 reg denote the fragment of DLR reg without Kleene star and counting, i.e., DLR . We already observed above that the operator · * of DLR reg is inexpressible in DL FU 1 . The fact that the number restriction operators (≤ k [$i]R) are definable neither in DL FU 1 nor in U 1 , as we shall prove, is somewhat more surprising since U 1 can do some counting. However, as we already discussed earlier, the counting ability of U 1 is limited.
Finally, it is not entirely trivial that we can indeed keep the composition operator in DLR 0 reg and still embed this logic into DL FU 1 . This is because the use of the composition operator often requires the three-variable fragment of first-order logic, and DL FU 1 collapses to FO 2 on binary vocabularies. . We first observe that we can use the the standard identity R•(S∪T ) = (R•S)∪(R•T ) of relation algebra to obtain from D an expression where the composition operators are on the "atomic" level, with the relational terms ε and R |$i,$j of the grammar of DLR reg regarded as atoms. We then use the equivalence
to obtain a disjunction of formulae ∃E i .C where E i is a composition of "atomic" terms S. To eliminate the composition operators from the terms E i = S 1 • ... • S n , we use the equivalence ∃ S 1 • ... • S n ).C ≡ ∃S 1 .∃S 2 .∃S 3 ... ∃S n .C. Thus we can eliminate instances of • from DLR 0 reg . Next we note that all the remaining union operators are also eliminable, using the equivalence
We then show how to translate the obtained formula (which is free of union and composition operators) into DL FU 1 . For presentational reasons, we will translate the formula into the first-order fragment FU 1 where R |$i,$j with i = j is not allowed; these are easy to eliminate. Our translation will be defined with three translation operators s, t, T that correspond to, respectively, the terms for R, E, C above. Each of these operators is parameterized by an appropriate tuple of variables. We first define T as follows.
We then show that none of the operators of DLR reg missing from DLR 0 reg could be added to DLR 0 reg without losing the embedding into DL FU 1 . By an operator we here mean · * and each term (≤ k [$i]R) with k ∈ Z + . Note that for a fixed k, the term (≤ k [$i]R) strictly speaking denotes a collection of operators, because we could vary i and the arity of R. Thus a more finegrained analysis than the one below could be given. We ignore this issue for the sake of simplicity. Proof. We already observed in the proof of Proposition 2 that DL FU 1 cannot define the concept ∃(R * ).A and that DLR reg cannot define ¬∃(¬R).A, where ¬ is the full negation of DL FU 1 . Thus it now suffices to show that for each k ∈ Z + , the concept (≤ k [$2]R) is not expressible in DL FU 1 . Here R is a binary relation.
In the proof of Theorem 3, we already dealt with the special case where k = 1: if ϕ(x) was an FU 1 -formula defining the concept (≤ 1 [$2]R), then the FU 1 -sentence ∀xϕ(x) would define that the in-degree of R is at most one. Thus we can now fix a k ≥ 2 and define two interpretations, one consisting of k + 1 copies of the clique of size k and the other one of k copies of the clique of size k + 1. (Recall that a clique is a structure where the binary relation R is the total relation with the reflexive loops removed).
We have prepared the setting in such a way that it is now easy to show, using once again the EF-game for U 1 (defined in [13] ), that the two structures satisfy exactly the same U 1 -sentences. However, the concept (≤ k − 1 [$2]R) is satisfied by every element in the first structure and by none of the elements of the second one. Thus no U 1 -formula is equivalent to (≤ k − 1 [$2]R), because if ϕ(x) was equivalent to (≤ k − 1 [$2]R), the U 1 -sentence ∃xϕ(x) would be satisfied by the first structure but not the second one.
